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ABSTRACT 
This essay deals with two issues. First, it tries to delineate, via the concept of enlarged fiduciary proviso, the 
contribution of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to the implementation of the EU Sustainability Strategy. The 
primary aim of the European institutions in delineating such strategy was to promote a concern for the environment, 
interpreted here as a proxy for the welfare of future generations of stakeholders. Progresses towards sustainable 
development can be made if we interpret CSR as a governance framework that extends fiduciary protection from a 
mono-stakeholder perspective, in which the sole relevant constituency for the design of corporate policy is the 
shareholders’, to a multi-stakeholder perspective, in which legitimate claims are held by a variety of constituencies, 
possibly operating at different times. Secondly, the essay tries to establish an organic link between the concept of 
sustainability and a Social Contract account of the business enterprise. The Social Contract of the stakeholders, an 
ideal reference point for corporate policy-makers, is formed behind a veil of ignorance, resulting in an agreement that 
is both impartial and nonhistorical.  
Keywords: Corporate Social responsibility (CSR),  Sustainability Strategy, Fiduciary Duties. 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: M14, O16, Q01.  
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Introduction  
This essay focuses on the big business enterprise, as the peculiar site place that is gaining weight vis-à-vis 
other decisional centers as the result of the privatization of previously public decisions, focusing on its 
contribution in order to progress towards sustainable development. It will be shown that an enterprise in 
which corporate decision-makers are fiduciaries of all legitimate stakeholders creates reliable safeguards 
in order to stimulate the specific investments of an array of categories. Furthermore, in this framework 
decisions are to be neutral with respect to those who do not take part in the transactions, in primis the 
future generations. This paper does not deal with environmental law and its enforcement; it assumes that 
corporations comply with the “rules of the game”, and make a further step, on the basis of self-regulation 
alone. They should do so upon recognising that contemporary and future stakeholders have a legitimate 
claim on present-time corporate activities. I try to provide the reader in this essay with a framework of 
impartial justification for managers’ abidance by an intergenerationally calibrated Social Contract 
amongst the corporate stakeholders. 
The paper is structured as follows. I start by pointing out the basic descriptive features of the 
modern big business. A possible answer to the problems of abuse of control and contractual 
incompleteness arising from such characterisation comes from the extension of fiduciary protection to an 
array of stakeholders. Section 2 describes the notion of fiduciary obligation, and Section 3 describes in 
greater details the structure of the multi-fiduciary model. A full-fledged attempt to build a multi-fiduciary 
model of corporate governance can be founds in the works by Sacconi, whose model is outlined in Section 
4. Section 5 describes sustainability, with references to the European institutions’ contributions to the 
issue. Section 6 tries to link the sustainability strategy to the model of the Social Contract amongst the 
stakeholders. Final remarks follow.  
 
1. Theory of the firm foundations  
This section starts with the remark that slight variations in the way we characterise the firm can produce 
major differences in the definition of the firm’s objective, specifically with respect to the question -In 
whose interest should the firm  be managed?-. The theory of the firm that we have in mind shapes the way 
in which we conceive corporate finance and governance (Zingales 2000: 1651). Zingales’s proposal is to 
consider the firm as a nexus of specific investments, a combination of mutually specialized assets and 
people1. In this approach, power relationships and access  to critical resources are more important than the 
contracts existing between the enterprise and its constituencies, and more important than ownership of the 
physical assets. The firm lies at the centre of a web of specific investments that need to be remunerated 
with tangible or intangible payoffs, according to some distributive principle. The fundamental problem 
that we face is then “how to allocate de jure control rights when there are multiple sources of de facto 
control rights” (Zingales 2000: 37), rights that are granted by access to some valuable resources.  
On the contrary, the nexus of contracts theory (Fama & Jensen 1983) stresses that all 
nonshareholder constituencies are completely indifferent as to the choices taken by equity holders, or by 
their fiduciaries, given that they are contractually protected in all possible future contingencies. This view 
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overlooks, however, two points which are of central importance to the present discourse: contractual 
incompleteness and the possibility of abuse stemming from the attribution of control rights. I start by 
analysing the second problem, assuming for now that contracts cannot be complete. It should be noticed 
that “for control rights to be valuable, the party in control must be able to make decisions that alter the 
distribution of payoffs among the members of the nexus” (Zingales 2000: 149). Interestingly, the 
possibility to “divert” a part of the cooperative rent produced by the firm towards the holder of control 
rights implies that other constituencies as well, and not only the equity holders, are unprotected in some 
circumstances, those in which their contract is silent. Control right holders may indeed threaten to exclude 
other constituencies from the team, by withdrawing the right to access the firm’s physical capital 
(Grossman & Hart 1986), to the point that the stakeholders will be indifferent between accepting such 
drawings in the ex post bargaining stage, taking place whenever an unforeseen and ex ante un-contracted 
upon contingency occurs, and dropping out from the corporate team, losing the cost of their initial 
investments. The question is then why, if the exercise of control interferes with the welfare of multiple 
categories, the shareholders are worth exclusive control rights, as the shareholder primacy norm 
prescribes.  
We face in fact a problem of “abuse” of the authority position, which arises whenever control 
rights are attributed to a single constituency, and whenever such constituency enjoys exclusive fiduciary 
duties from those who actually manage the corporation2. It does not come as a surprise that, given the 
possibility of ex post opportunism in the renegotiation stage, Grossman & Hart (1986) conclude that 
control rights should be assigned to the party whose investment is the most crucial, and the easiest to 
expropriate. The way in which control rights are attributed, and the way in which the surplus is divided ex 
post, affect in relevant ways the ex ante incentives to make specific investments by all stakeholders. This 
happens for two reasons: first, rational agents will not be willing to make investments in firm-specific 
resources if they have the expectation that they will not  be properly (and equitably) rewarded ex post. 
Problems of efficiency and of distributive equity are thus better treated in a joint fashion. Second, rational 
agents will spend resources in inefficient power-seeking activities, whose only aim is to increase their 
bargaining strength in the ex post stage (Zingales, 2000). The nexus of contracts theory, whence the 
shareholder primacy norm typically derives, does not provide for generalised safeguards against the 
hazards deriving from attribution of exclusive rights of control over the firm. The theory of the firm as a 
nexus of specific investments seems instead to provide a better framework in order to analyse the problem.  
Is the description of contracting we have adopted so far accurate? Nexus of contracts theorists 
argue that fixed-claim holders, such as the employees, should bargain for the most desired terms in a 
contract, viewed as a complete representation of what the parties consent to. The literature, however, has 
identified three main reasons why contracts may be written incompletely: firstly, agents are only 
boundedly rational (cf. Simon 1947); secondly, negotiating is costly; thirdly, specifying contingencies in 
contracts is costly too, as the information possessed by the parties is usually asymmetric (Hart 1993). It 
has been appropriately observed that only in a world in which contracts are incomplete corporate 
governance can be a topic of interest (Zingales 1998: 499). If contracts were complete, authority and 
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corporate governance would be redundant: a series of spot contracts would suffice, so that corporate 
governance would boil down to contractual governance.  
Still, the challenge for the firm as a nexus of specific investments is to create reliable safeguards 
ensuring that the attribution of control, with particular regard to the right to appoint Board members, does 
not lower the non-controlling constituencies’ incentives to invest. My view is that fiduciary duties will be 
a critical element of the answer to this problem.   
 
2. The notion of fiduciary obligation  
My attempt here is to  specify the basic features of the multi-fiduciary approach to corporate governance. I 
shall show in subsequent sections that under certain conditions the multi-fiduciary model does not leave 
managers free to pursue their interest alone by exploiting their role of “mediating hierarchs”3.  
The first point I shall be dealing with is whether the fiduciary relationship between the corporate 
managers (directors and officers) and the shareholders can be interpreted as an agency relationship. 
Interestingly, for a long time, the category of fiduciary duties has been analysed with the instruments of 
the law of trusts (Brudney 1985: 1407). Great examples of a trusteeship approach to the problem of 
managers’ duties come from Berle’s work of 1931, and from Dodd’s answer in 1932, on the Harvard Law 
Review. The opinion of the two authors differed on the crucial question -for whom are corporate 
managers trustees?-. Both authors substantially agreed, however, on framing the problem of managers’ 
fiduciary duties within a trusteeship framework. The word trusteeship is an English jurisprudence 
invention, and stands for the appropriate standard of conduct of individuals or groups who control or 
manage assets they do not beneficially own (Kay 1997: 114)4. In their fundamental work, Grossman and 
Hart (1986) have described ownership as the right to take residual and un-contracted upon decisions 
within an incomplete contractual arrangement. The authors described, perhaps unintentionally, exactly the 
role of a trustee (Kay 1997: 114). The settlor of property, for example, unable to determine the 
circumstances that can arise after his death, appoints a trustee who has authority to determine the courses 
of action in those contingencies that could not be foreseen at time of establishment of the contractual 
relationship (Leslie 2005: 1).  
The great contender to a trusteeship approach to corporate directors’ duties is agency theory, a line 
of thought much more developed analytically than trusteeship. In his celebrated 1985 article, Professor 
Clark wondered whether the agency model has the hermeneutic power to describe the relationship 
between the stockholders and the directors and officers, and the relationship between directors and officers 
and the corporation. The answer he gave was clearly negative. While agency (equated here to shareholder 
primacy) asks directors to maximise the value of the equity holders’ investment, trusteeship asks them to 
sustain the value of all assets of the corporation (Kay 1997: 114). In the trusteeship perspective, therefore, 
the claim of the shareholders is one of the claims the trustee has to take into account, an idea coherent with 
the framework of Sacconi (2006), discussed in Section 4.  
The extent to which trust is granted can be limited through a set of standards (or fiduciary duties). 
In this regard, Frankel (1998: 129) has underlined that the overarching aim of fiduciary law is promoting 
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trust: fiduciary law vests in fact in the trustor the legal right to rely on the trustworthiness of his trustee, by 
imposing obligations on the latter. Flannigan (1989), in a fundamental contribution on the fiduciary type 
of obligation, distinguished between two general types of trust: vigilant trust and deferential trust. In the 
first, the trusting party typically retains certain rights of influence vis-à-vis the trusted, while in the second 
the discretion granted to the trusted is broader in scope. According to the author, the principal/agent 
relation is always an example of vigilant trust, due to the fact that the decisions of the trusted party are 
usually objectionable and the trusting party benefits from an obedience duty. In this sense, the principal 
retains control. The  beneficiary/trustee relation can be of either type, depending on the extent of the 
delegation of power. Between agents and trustees there is hence a factual similarity in that they are both 
selected for their personal abilities, i.e. for their competencies in transforming a series of investments into 
a super-additive cooperative surplus. In a deferential trustee/beneficiary relation, however, the beneficiary 
cannot object that a decision of the trusted party did not correspond to his will, differently from what can 
prototypically happen in an agency relationship. At first glance it would seem that beneficiaries are more 
vulnerable than principals, due to the restrictedness of control rights. Fiduciary duties form a system of 
checks  on managerial autonomy.  
After this brief introduction to the concept of trusteeship, we come back to the question of 
extending fiduciary protection to an array of trustors, the stakeholders of the corporation. Saying that 
trusteeship provides us with better analytic tools than agency is in fact not enough: we must identify who 
the trustors are5.  
We can distinguish two analytical levels in trusteeship theory (Licht 2004: 7): 
1. trustee’s duty to mediate among the trustors’ legitimate interests, and to preserve and enhance the value 
of the assets under her control. These assets are the specific investments of all the corporate stakeholders, 
investments that are used as inputs in the production stage, processed through the competencies that amass 
at the top management layers of the corporation; 
2. trustee’s conflict of interests, i.e. the peculiar case in which she can be tempted to divert to herself a 
share of the cooperative surplus which would seem irrational under ideal bargaining conditions. This 
constitutes a powerful deterrent for specific investments to take place ex ante.  
 Two remarks are under way at this point. First, although the behavioural foundations of the model 
cannot be explored here, suffice it to say that the trusteeship strategy complicates the agent’s motivational 
structure6. Trusteeship is in fact an ex ante strategy that tries to act on the economic agent’s incentives, 
much in the same way in which rewards try to do the same from an ex post perspective. Secondly, 
trusteeship does not apply only to directors: the law may call to act as trustees external institutions, such as 
Courts or consulting firms. For example, trusteeship is encouraged by most corporate law jurisdictions, 
whenever laws (or self-regulation codes) provide for a number of independent directors to sit on the Board 
(cf. e.g. article 2387 of the Italian Civil Code).   
The jurist’s viewpoint on fiduciary duties is that they are an example of legal claims (Hohfeld 
1917). Legal claims are demands addressed on other subjects: in this sense they are correlative, for a legal 
claim makes sense only if we look at the correlated duties it brings about, i.e. the kind of obligations it 
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imposes on subjects other than the rightholder (cf. Sacconi 1991: 56). We turn now to a description of the 
multi-fiduciary model, where notions will be applied that I have outlined so far.  
 
3. The structure of the multi-fiduciary model  
I try to describe in this section the fundamental steps that justify the contention that fiduciary protection 
should be attributed in an inclusive rather than exclusive fashion:  
1. the stakeholders’ contracts  with the firm, arising out of formal contracts or of stakes alone (implicit 
contracts), are incomplete: they do not contain clauses, i.e. applicable standards of behaviour, for 
unforeseen contingencies.  
2. the investments of the stakeholders are firm-specific: they are made with regard to a specific contractual 
(or governance) relationship. In the case of non-specific assets, transaction cost considerations would lead 
rational agents to use market contracting, rather than an authority-based system. Asset specificity 
determines that the resources used for a certain purpose cannot be transferred elsewhere without loss of 
value, which leads stakeholders to keep their investments in the firm rather than to resort to the 
marketplace to realise their value;  
3. the cooperative surplus, on which legitimate claims will arise in the distribution stage, depends crucially 
upon ex ante investments by all stakeholders, investments in human, equity, debt and trust capital, as well 
as on valuable elements such as reputation and leadership; 
4. if the parties are assumed to be opportunistic in their contractual behaviour, which is particularly likely 
whenever the corporate controllers do not undertake a credible commitment to abide by a principle of 
distributive fairness, asset specificity determines that in unforeseen contingencies there will be space for 
ex post renegotiation, where those who enjoy control have a favourable bargaining position; all 
constituencies’ investment is thus potentially at risk; 
5. if control rights are given to a party only, then that constituency can make a credible threat to exclude 
others from the nexus of investments. In this sense, for control to be wielded legitimately, and for specific 
investments to take place at second-best levels7, authority holders have to choose such corporate policies 
that bring about a state of the world whose distributive characteristics resemble the ones that would be 
settled upon in an ideal bargaining situation.  
I argue that, in order to keep all these pieces together, we need to guarantee that those who can 
take relevant decisions in the corporation, even if elected by a party only, are fiduciaries of all 
stakeholders. The fiduciary duty to reward all parities as would seem rational in a hypothetical deliberative 
setting (Sacconi’s pactum unionis, which I shall explore later on in this essay) constitutes a credible 
safeguard for all stakeholders that they will be equitably treated and fairly remunerated by the corporation 
in the distributive stage.  
The five points I have outlined above are meant to provide a descriptive argument for a normative 
stakeholder theory that would imply an extension of fiduciary protection  to all legitimate stakeholders. 
The nexus of contracts theory does not sufficiently protect constituencies from abuse, thus reducing the 
total investments in the firm, since the possibility of abuse creates disincentives to invest.  
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 Classical criticisms to the argument set out above are that non-shareholder constituencies are 
protected enough by contract, and that fiduciary protection should be accorded to the residual claimants 
only. This is opinion of scholars of the calibre of Macey & Miller (1993: 410). They claim that fiduciary 
protection should be accorded to shareholders, and to them only, for the aggregate value of the fiduciary 
duties to the corporate constituencies diminishes as the number of beneficiaries grows. This contention 
ignores however the central point that authority, and exclusive fiduciary protection accorded to one 
constituency only, interferes negatively with many constituencies’ investment decisions. Fiduciary 
protection cannot, therefore, be regarded as a commodity whose value is negatively correlated with the 
number of trustors.  
A point that should be retained from the nexus of contracts literature, however, is that fiduciary 
duties should be narrowly defined. It is interesting to ask whether this is at odds with the scope of 
fiduciary protection attribution. The answer to this question seems to be negative: albeit managers cannot 
be left free to choose the beneficiary’s interest they would like to pursue, they can be required to refer to 
an ideal bargaining situation, where the stakeholders are ignorant about the specific attributes of their 
entitlement. The correlative duties that arise out of such enlarged fiduciary obligation, which descends 
from an ideal position, are thus not arbitrary. Rather, a new corporate objective function and a balancing 
criterion which respects basic criteria of equity and rationality will be the result of this approach to moral 
thinking, which we dub Social Contract ethics.    
 
4. The Social Contract amongst the corporate stakeholders8 
The firm’s characterisation as a nexus of specific investments opens the door to a normative problem of 
mediation among possibly competing claims. We have seen, furthermore, that responsibilities arise for 
corporate managers to manage the relationships with an array of stakeholders, arguably the essence of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). In this section possible answers are provided to the question of 
how we can specify the content of the extended fiduciary obligations towards all stakeholders, in such a 
way as to provide clear managerial guidance9. 
The definition of CSR with which Sacconi provides us is the following:  
 
“a model of extended corporate governance whereby those who run a firm (entrepreneurs, directors, managers) have 
responsibilities that range from fulfilment of their fiduciary duties towards the owners to fulfilment of analogous 
fiduciary duties towards all the firm’s stakeholders” (Sacconi 2006: 262).  
 
CSR is viewed hence as a corporate governance framework which extends fiduciary protection from a 
mono-stakeholder perspective, in which the only relevant stakeholder for the design of corporate policy is 
the shareholders, to a multi-stakeholder one, in which valid entitlements over the firm’s cooperative 
surplus are held by a variety of claimants.  
CSR, in the way we have just defined it, legitimizes and gives completion to the enterprise as an 
institution for the governance of transactions. The enterprise creates a legitimate system of governance 
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only in the case in which the residual right of decision is completed by fiduciary duties towards all those 
constituencies that are at risk of abuse from the enterprise, and that do not enjoy the residual right of 
control.  
Given that in cooperative ventures, such as the firm, several legitimate claims compete for a share 
of the cooperative surplus, “[…] we need a criterion able to identify the balance that any whatever 
stakeholder would accept as the basis for its voluntary cooperation with the firm: that is, an impartial 
criterion” (Sacconi 2004: 13). This balancing criterion is the First Social Contract (or, pactum unionis), an 
ideal bargaining situation where force and fraud are not allowed, and with the possibility of dropping out. 
The First Social Contract is a constitutional agreement which the stakeholders reach amongst themselves 
to set up a generic Vereinigung, once they recognize that if they cooperate they can benefit from the super-
additivity of benefits (formally:
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the pactum unionis, the contractors single out one constituency, the one that minimises governance cost 
while minimising the contracting costs of all other parties, as in Hansmann (1996).   
The pactum unionis is complemented in Sacconi’s analysis by a second agreement, named Second 
Social Contract (or pactum subjections). Here, the stakeholders constitute a real governance structure for 
the association, and agree to accept authority (and appointment and residual rights to a constituency) if the 
corporate decision-makers respect the two different provisos:  
1. A NARROW FIDUCIARY PROVISO: the “owners”, who manage the corporation directly (closely-held 
corporations) or appoint the Board of Directors (as  it typically happens in public companies), are 
remunerated with the maximum residual revenue possible. However, all other stakeholders will accept the 
wielding of authority only in the presence of a further, extended, fiduciary proviso. 
2. AN EXTENDED FIDUCIARY PROVISO:  
2.1 towards the non-owners: the firm must abstain from activities that impose negative 
externalities on constituencies that do not take part in the corporate activities, or compensate them 
so that they remain neutral. Furthermore, the firm must remunerate the stakeholders participating 
in the activities of the corporation with payoffs which, taken for granted a fair status quo, must be 
somewhat tied to the firm’s economic performance. The aim is to approximate fair shares of the 
cooperative surplus, which would seem rational in a hypothetical bargaining situation (the pactum 
unionis); 
2.2 towards the owners: the firm must remunerate the owners with the maximum residual, 
compatible with fair remuneration of the specific investments made by all other constituencies. 
Authority is thus delegated to the stakeholder who is most efficient in performing governance functions. 
This class is remunerated with the residual earnings, and is chosen to appoint those who will actually 
manage the firm, i.e. the managers. The wielding of authority is legitimate as long as the controlling 
constituency, or its appointees, conforms to the First Social Contract. The resulting corporate goal is not 
the univocal maximisation of any constituency’s stake. Rather, the manager faces a hierarchy of goals 
descending from the pactum unionis, which can be ordered from the broadest to the narrowest:  
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- minimize the negative externalities that affect individuals or constituencies  which do not participate in 
the transactions, both in regard to present and future corporate stakeholders. By minimizing externalities 
on future stakeholders, corporate decision-makers take care of a sub-class of future generations’ members. 
In so doing, they provide a relevant contribution to the implementation of the EU’s sustainability strategy, 
as I shall show in greater details later in this essay. The absence of externalities constitutes thus the first 
filter for admissible corporate policies under the Social Contract amongst the stakeholders view. Those not 
participating directly in the transactions have a right to remain unaffected by the activities of the firm.  
- devise the appropriate corporate policy that results in the maximization of the value of the stakes, as 
approximated by the Nash solution to the bargaining problem, of all legitimate stakeholders.  
- within this “subset” of admissible policies, the manager should pursue the maximum possible 
shareholder value.  
It is evident that such a hierarchy of goals determines fairly univocally compliant (with the Social 
Contract) and uncompliant corporate policies. The distribution of the cooperative surplus is thus not left to 
managers’ discretion: each stakeholder should get a share that approximates what each category would get 
in an ideal bargaining situation. Managerial guidance as to the maximand10 that should be pursued comes 
from Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem over the cooperative surplus11, providing a solution to the 
bargaining problem we have dubbed pactum unionis. The properties of this solution are well known. In 
particular, Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem ensures that: 
 
1 the bargaining parties obtain at least the payoff that they would obtain had they abstained from entering 
the team;  
2. the solution distributes the product in such a way that, in a two-persons game, 
2
1
2
1
a
a
U
U
−=
∂
∂
, where 
iU is the utility of stakeholder i associated to a generic transaction, and 
2
1
a
a
 is a distributive ratio: for each 
unit of utility given to player 1, it measures how much it is given to player 2. Nash’s solution distributes 
utilities proportionally to the ratio between the marginal variations in the players’ utilities. If the utility 
units are interpersonally calibrated, this can be interpreted as an equivalent to a distribution proportional to 
the relative needs of the players, a characteristic that makes up to the fairness (and acceptability from an 
impartial position) of the solution.  
 Guidance as to the way in which distributive conflicts should be adjudicated comes instead by 
reference to the pactum unionis, i.e. an impartial setting in which ignorance about one’s one particular 
objectives prevails.  
  The single most interesting result of this argument is that shareholders have now a legitimate 
claim to a fair remuneration, and not to the maximum possible remuneration, of their investment. This 
opens the way both to a multi-stakeholder governance style and to the concept of sustainability, in order to 
ensure that flows of specific investments will be provided now and in the future. The sustainable 
corporation secures itself future stakeholders’ investments by committing itself at the current time to 
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provide them with a fair share of the cooperative surplus at future times. This can only be achieved if 
current corporate policies do not undermine future generations’ ability to meet their needs.  
Sacconi’s pactum unionis constitutes an important starting point in order to shape a constructivist 
methodology capable of delivering principles of intergenerational justice. Moreover, Rawls’s 
characterisation of the motivational structure and of the information available to contractors seems 
applicable to the corporate stakeholders’ constitutional problem. We need in fact “to create (or, more 
precisely, to imagine the creation of) a certain kind of choice situation – an ‘original position’- such that 
whatever principles are chosen it will be just” (Barry 1989: 265). These are issues of intergenerational 
justice to which we turn our attention in the remainder of this paper. The next section defines 
sustainability, referring succinctly to the European Union institutions’ documents on the subject.  
 
5. Sustainability and the European Union 
We adopt here the conventional definition of Sustainable Development (SD) of the Brundtland 
Report (WCED 1987: 43): development is sustainable whenever the satisfaction of the needs of the 
present does not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Otherwise stated, 
sustainable development implies a weighing of present needs against those of future generations (Postma 
2002: 44), with the aim of “minimising our interference with the lives of future generations” (id. at 47), 
what the author names a “negative morality” approach. The compatibility of this approach with the 
principles of justice stemming from Sacconi’s pactum unionis is striking.  
Two different dimensions of sustainability are usually patched together in the EU institutions’ 
documents13, and must be clearly spelled out (Vercelli 2005a): on the one side, a criterion of equity in the 
intergenerational distribution of resources; on the other, an issue of resource allocation among 
contemporaries. I shall concentrate here on the first aspect, involving the equitable treatment of future 
generations, leaving  the second for future study.  
Generally speaking, corporations can hardly be expected to take care of the welfare of future 
generations, as such an obligation would be too broad and too difficult to define. A more modest (and 
more realistic) contribution to any sustainability strategy would be to expect them to take care of the 
welfare of future generations of stakeholders14 (a similar contention can be found in Steurer et al. 2005: 
274, and in the works quoted therein). 
The firm, like society at large (Rawls 2005: 15), is interpreted here as a fair system of cooperation 
over time. This provides us with a first, convincing answer to the question of why corporate decision 
makers should take care of the stake in a venture operating at the present time of future generations of 
stakeholders. The answer can be found in the remark that future generations have a legitimate stake in the 
corporate decisions taken now. I subscribe therefore to Vercelli’s definition of the sustainable enterprise: it 
is that enterprise which  enduringly creates value for its stakeholders (Vercelli 2005b: 361).  
The European Union has devoted a considerable effort in promoting the adoption of sustainable 
practices at all levels of public and private decision-making. In COM (2001) 264 final (Commission’s 
proposal to the Gothenburg European Council), it is stressed that the EU sustainability strategy completes 
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the Lisbon framework by adding an environmental dimension to the social cohesion and economic growth 
objectives (p. 2). The report quotes several problems that pose a serious threat to sustainable development: 
emissions of greenhouse gases and the resulting global warming and loss of biodiversity, above all. 
Intended as a concern for environmental issues and new generations’ welfare, CSR has a well-established 
link to sustainability, as  is evident in the Commission’s definition of CSR: 
 
“by stating their social responsibility, and voluntarily taking on commitments which go beyond common regulatory 
and conventional requirements, which they would have to respect in any case, companies endeavour to raise the 
standards of social development, environmental protection and respect of fundamental rights and embrace an open 
governance, reconciling interests of various stakeholders in an overall approach of quality and sustainability” 
(COM(2001) 366: 3). 
 
The proper framework in order to analyse the problem of balancing contemporary and future interests 
comes from Sacconi’s Social Contract. The bridging between a static model such as Sacconi’s and the 
issue of sustainability can be established by drawing insights from Rawls’s characterisation of the original 
position.  
 
6. Sustainability in the context of Social Contract Business Ethics 
Corporations should take care of contemporary and future stakeholders’ interests as they recognise the 
legitimacy of their entitlement. As we have seen, this obligation calls for a normative theory providing 
corporate managers with both a maximand, capable of replacing the unsatisfactory present share-value 
maximisation norm, and a criterion for adjudicating conflicts among potentially diverging claims. The 
normative theory adopted here is Social Contract Business Ethics (SCBE), a position grounded on the 
“idea that human interaction and association should be guided and constrained only by those norms and 
institutions that freely consenting agents could and possibly would agree to if they had the choice” 
(Heugens et al. 2006: 213). The term SCBE merges the contractarian and contractualist approaches to the 
justification problem of contracting, in particular mutual advantage versus impartiality, a much debated 
divide within such normative theory I shall leave unaddressed here (cf. Barry 1989). 
The sustainable corporation internalises in its objective function the welfare of the future 
generations of stakeholders and of the environment, intended as a stock of natural resources. In this 
regard, the Social Contract should provide guidance as to the responsible treatment of the environment and 
of the stakeholders operating in the future. Regarding the environment, as a stock of natural resources, the 
Social Contract should be an ideal reference point for corporate decision-makers in managing the 
ecological footprint15 of the corporation. A ready example comes from decisions on CO2 emissions, a 
point explicitly mentioned in the Communication from the Commission on the Review of the Sustainable 
Development Strategy (COM(2005) 658 final, p. 4).  
But  how can we account for the entitlement of the environment in the design of corporate policy? 
Can the environment even be considered a stakeholder strictu sensu, i.e. one of the participants to the 
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formation of the Social Contract? My answer is that the interest of the environment is accounted for 
whenever future generations of stakeholders are guaranteed a fair share of the cooperative surplus. This is 
to say that environmental protection, and sustainable development, if the two terms are taken to be 
coextensive, is a natural follow-up to the equitable treatment of contemporary and future stakeholders of 
the firm. In this regard, my view diverges from the position of those theorists defending an approach based 
on the notion of corporate environmental responsibility (cf. e.g. DesJardins 1998). These authors typically 
derive from this responsibility a duty to use sustainably the natural resources. Alternatively, I argue here 
that the Social Contract should contain enough specifications as to the corporate policies that should be 
adopted in order to make environmental protection a natural result of the process of corporate policy 
design. The perspective of the “users” of the environment is thus privileged, assuming a sustainability 
approach in that we consider all generations of users, instead of an approach based on the notion of natural 
environment as primordial stakeholder, i.e. as a separate category of analysis (an example of this approach 
can be found in Driscoll & Starik 2004). This is coherent also with the spirit of several institutional 
documents dealing with Sustainable Development issues, such as the Brundtland Report, whereby it is 
stressed that the main aim of Sustainable Development is not the minimisation of negative environmental 
effects, but rather the maximisation of intergenerational welfare (cf. Steurer 2005: 273). The results of the 
two approaches are, however, markedly similar. In particular, both Social Contract and environmental 
responsibility theorists would agree on the fundamental point that each “business has the obligation to use 
resources at appropriate rates and compensate ecosystems for the loss of productive capacity caused by its 
activity” (DesJardins 1998: 832). From the Social Contract viewpoint, in fact, doing otherwise would 
impinge on the ability of future stakeholders to enjoy an intergenerationally fair share of the cooperative 
surplus.  
 The sustainable enterprise is usually identified in the managerial literature as the enterprise with a 
long-term orientation, aiming at a ‘zero-discharge’ and ‘zero-risk’ goal, just as the ‘zero- defects’ goal in 
quality control demands preventative action and continuous improvement at each step of the production 
process (Shrivastava 1995: 945).  
In sketching the basic features of the “sustainable” Social Contract amongst the stakeholders, we 
find important insights in the Rawlsian construction of the original position. From the viewpoint of a 
mutual advantage version of SCBE (or, contractarianism), as the relationship between the contemporaries 
and later generations is characterised by an asymmetry of power and knowledge (Barry 1977: 273), the 
establishment of a genuinely moral relationship is compromised. In this sense, following a remark by 
Barry (1989: 192), it seems appropriate to talk about a problem of justice with respect to other 
generations, rather than of justice between generations. Rawls provides us with a convincing answer to 
this problem, whereby the fair terms of social cooperation are grounded on the notion of reciprocity, i.e. a 
blend of impartiality and mutual advantage (Quong 2007; Rawls 2005: 16-17). I shall focus my attention 
on the motivation of the contractors and on the information package available to them in an impartial 
bargaining situation, viewed as the cornerstone for the construction of a constructivist moral theory.  
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In A Theory of Justice (revised edition of 1999) Rawls describes a fair procedure capable of 
delivering impartial principles of justice. The idealised setting is called by Rawls the “original position” 
(Rawls 1999: 118), while the procedural method “veil of ignorance” (id.). In the original position, “no one 
knows his situation in society nor his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor 
principles to his advantage” (Rawls 1999: 120-121). Furthermore, ignorance is to be assumed about the 
stock of natural resources available and the state of technology (Rawls 2005: 273). Informationally, 
therefore, the contractors face ignorance about their own identities, with special regard to their actual role 
in society and the exact time they will be called to operate within it. He adds: 
 
“There is also, theoretically anyway, the question of a reasonable genetic policy. In these cases too, in order to carry 
through the idea of the original position, the parties must not know the contingencies that set them in opposition. 
They must choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever generation they turn 
out to belong to” (Rawls 1999: 119).  
 
The Social Contract, therefore, should contain rules that apply to each possible generation in which the 
constituents may be called to live. The relevance of such argument for the present purposes is evident. The 
sustainability problem is in fact eased in the moment in which the Social Contract is viewed as a 
bargaining stage in which the contractors choose an appropriate constitution without specific regard to 
time. I must briefly mention, however, some of the problems raised by the early Rawlsian solution to the 
problem of intergenerational equity, difficulties illustrated in Brian Barry’s Justice Between Generations 
(1977). Rawls (1999: 121; 2005: 273) postulates that those behind the veil of ignorance form an assembly 
of contemporaries, taking as a reference point the time of entry. The contractors know that they will all be 
living at the same time, albeit they ignore in which specific time they will be operating. According to 
Barry, this opens the door to an n-generation prisoner’s dilemma: each cohort of contemporaries may be 
willing to constrain its choices, for the sake of sustainability, only on the condition that predecessors have 
done the same. The Rawlsian original position entails, however, ignorance about predecessors. It is a 
straightforward conclusion that it would be optimal to exploit the environment at one time, after all other 
generations have adopted an optimal saving rate. As all generations are symmetrically rational, the 
classical prisoner’s dilemma failure obtains (cf. for a practical example De-Shalit 1995: 96).  
According to Barry, Rawls should have dropped the postulate of contemporaneousness, and allow 
for contractors belonging to all possible generations of human history, in order to make comparisons with 
predecessors irrelevant. This, however, is not the path followed by Rawls, who ties together 
“predecessors”, “contemporaries” and “successors” in a more subtle fashion: 
 
“to achieve a reasonable result, we assume first, that the parties represent family lines, say, who care at least about 
their more immediate descendants; and, second, that the principle adopted must be such that they wish all earlier 
generations to have followed it. These constraints, together with the veil of ignorance, are to insure that one 
generation looks out for all” (Rawls 1999: 255). 
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The principle Rawls mentions is the “savings principle”, according to which “each generation 
must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilisation, and maintain intact those just institutions that 
have been established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital 
accumulation” (Rawls 1999: 252). Such principle descends directly from Rawls’s characterisation of 
society as an intergenerationally calibrated system of fair cooperation. The formulation of the problem that 
we find in Political Liberalism (2005), however, is slightly different. The construction of the original 
position entails here that the agreement reached is nonhistorical, by this meaning that the contractors want 
all previous generations to have reached a similar agreement, as underlined in Rawls’s lecture The Basic 
Structure as Subject (2005): 
 
“Thus the correct principle is that which the members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the 
one their generation is to follow and as the principle they would want preceding generations to have followed (and 
later generations to follow), no matter how far back (or forward) in time” (Rawls 2005: 274).  
 
In a footnote to the passage quoted above, Rawls notices that this formulation does not alter the 
fundamental motivational structure of the decisions-makers deliberating behind the veil of ignorance, 
based on non-tuism. In A Theory of Justice, on the contrary, Rawls appeals to a “motivational dimension”, 
introducing a constraint according to which each contractor cares about some of her immediate successors, 
instead of following the “multi-representative” path, in which representatives of all generations of history 
gather behind the veil of ignorance.  
The motivation stipulation introduced in A Theory of Justice has been harshly criticised by Barry 
(1977: 279), who points out how the motivational assumption is an ad hoc assumption in order to justify 
obligations to posterity, and is in the end incoherent with the original position’s basic features, especially 
with principle of ignorance and non-tuism that leads to the maximisation of one’s own self-interest in 
terms of primary goods16 (cf. in particular section 25 of Rawls’s Theory of Justice). The formidable 
cognitive and descriptive problems raised by a gathering of all generations, difficulties recognised by 
Barry himself (1977: 280), make Rawls’s characterisation of contractors as family lines a better reference 
point for the present purposes. As Rawls himself notices:  
 
 “the original position is to be characterised with sufficient exactness so that it is possible to work out from the nature 
of the parties and the situation they confront which conception of justices favoured by the balance of reasons” (Rawls 
2005: 274).  
 
Recapitulating, since the contractors cannot identify themselves in the original position by description, 
several problems such as coalition formation or tailoring one’s own interests are solved. The fundamental 
feature of contractors in the original position is that they are to be understood solely as free and equal 
moral persons, deliberating behind a “thick” veil of ignorance (Rawls 2005: 273). The formulation of the 
 16 
savings problem defended in Political Liberalism seems to constitute a better reference point than the one 
defended in A Theory of Justice17, as it is more coherent with the basic features of the Rawlsian original 
position.   
 
Final Remarks  
I have tried in this essay to sketch the features of the multi-fiduciary approach to corporate governance. I 
have also tried to link this model to the problem of sustainability, and in particular to the EU sustainability 
strategy. I have proposed that the business enterprise can contribute effectively towards Sustainable 
Development if corporate decision-makers grant fiduciary protection to all legitimate stakeholders at  
present and future times, by referring to a decisional setting deprived of time-references (the Social 
Contract amongst the stakeholder). Contractors behind the veil of ignorance, in the Rawlsian framework, 
deliberate about the rate of consumption of natural resources in the same way in which they would have 
desired all previous generations had deliberated.  
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Notes 
                                               
1
 In the transaction-costs framework, the firm is a transactional mode which results out of the specificity of the assets 
involved in production. This explains why, as an instance, in  Grossman and Hart (1986) authority over the physical 
assets is assigned to that category whose investment is the most specific and crucial for the enterprise. 
2
 The point has been made, among others, by Sacconi (2006, 2007) and Blair & Stout (1999). 
3
 The expression is borrowed from Blair & Stout (1999). The point that managers need a single-valued objective 
function in order to be evaluated in a principled way is typically associated to Jensen (2001). He remarks that 
“stakeholder theory should not be viewed as a legitimate contender to [shareholder] value maximisation because it 
fails to provide a complete specification of the corporate purpose or objective function. To put the matter more 
concretely, whereas value maximisation provides corporate managers with a single objective, stakeholder theory 
directs corporate managers to serve ‘many masters’ ” (Jensen, 2001: 9). This essay tries to show the inaccuracies of 
this reasoning, by showing that an inclusive and multi-valued objective function can indeed be prescriptive and 
morally binding for corporate managers.   
4
 The leading case is Learoyd v. Whiteley (House of Lords, August 1st, 1887). In this ruling it was established that “as 
a general rule the law requires of a trustee no higher degree of diligence in the execution of his office than a man of 
ordinary prudence would exercise in the management of his own private affairs”.   
5
 As the Supreme Court of the United States wrote in the case SEC v. Chenery Corp. (318 US 80 [1943]), “to say that 
a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What 
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the 
consequences of his deviation from duty?”. Framing directors’ duties as trustees’ duties, therefore, is only a 
(descriptively coherent) starting point to ask ourselves to whom the fiduciary protection should be accorded.  
6
 Trusteeship, in fact, “assumes that, in the absence of strongly-focused or ‘high-powered’ monetary incentives to 
behave opportunistically, agents will respond to the ‘low-powered’ incentives of conscience, pride and reputation 
and are thus more likely to manage in the interests of their principals” (Hansmann & Kraakman 2004: 27). 
Trusteeship thus complicates the rudimentary anthropology of homo economicus, a feature that opens the possibility 
to establish a link between this heterodox approach to fiduciary duties and the recent behavioural literature on the 
motivational complexity of the agents (Fehr and Schmidt, 2000).  
7
 Grossman and Hart (1986) show that the attribution of control rights lowers inescapably someone’s investment 
decision, precluding the possibility to reach first best investment decisions.  
8
 This section draws substantially from Sacconi (2004, 2006, 2007).  
9
 Compare Jensen (2001) and note 2. The introduction of an intergenerational dimension within the corporate-policy 
design process can possibly add even more indeterminacy about the managerial bottom line. It was Rawls who first 
noticed that the problem of intergenerational justice “subjects any ethical theory to sever if not impossible tests” 
(Rawls 1999: 251). If, however, following Rawls, we interpret the original position as a perspective that we can 
adopt at any time we might be seeking guidance, then it is straightforward that it must not make any difference when 
or who is taking this perspective. The conclusions reached should be constant (Rawls, 1999: 120).  
10
 Maximand, a term proposed by Licht (2004), stands here for the corporate objective function that managers are 
asked to maximise.  
11
 Formally,






∈−∈ ∏
=
n
i
ii
Nash SxdxdSf
1
:)(maxarg),( , where S is a utility possibility set that can be found 
in a certain distributive setting, and Sd ∈ is the disagreement point, i.e. what the parties would obtain if no 
agreement were reached.  
13
 To quote an example, cf. 10255/1/05 (Presidency Conclusions- Brussels European Council of June 2005).   
14
 In a recent motion for a European Parliament resolution on CSR: A New Partnership, Rapporteur Richard Howitt 
states that “whereas companies cannot be a substitute for public authorities when the latter fail to exercise control 
over compliance with social and environmental standards, … increasing social and environmental responsibility by 
business, linked to the principle of corporate accountability, represents an essential element … of Europe’s Strategy 
for Sustainable development” (p. 6, 2006/2133 (INI)).  
15
 The concept was first introduced by William Rees in 1992, and stands for the demand of humans (or aggregates of 
humans) on nature. 
16
 These are goods that increase the contractors’ ability “to achieve whatever she wants or desires”, and comprises 
basic liberties (De-Shalit 1995: 101).  
17
 Rawls recognises that a similar formulation  can be found in English (1977). Interestingly, she points out that even 
assuming a present time of entry interpretation without any further specifications, the savings rate will be positive, 
due the fact that at each time of history several generations co-exist. Each contractor behind the veil of ignorance 
tries to maximise her welfare over the entire life-span. She does not know, however, whether she will turn out to 
belong to the class which we label “young”, or “middle-aged”, or “elderly”. Even in a context of contemporary non-
tuists, therefore, contractors behind the veil of ignorance will decide to save. This contention leaves unaddressed, 
nevertheless, the problem of decisions which produce effects beyond the reasonable life-span of the contractors.  
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